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BANKRUPTCY LAW 
IN RE MITCHELL: STANDARDS OF 
VALUATION IN CHAPTER 13 
PROCEEDINGS UNDE~ 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In re MitchelP marks the first examination by a circuit 
court of valuation standards used hi Chapter 13 proceedings to 
establish the value of a creditor's secured claim in a vehicle. II In 
Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit held that the standard to be applied 
in most cases is a vehicle's wholesale values and that any other 
standard, such as retail value, should be applied only where the 
debtor ~ses a vehicle as part of a going concern." This note will 
show that the Mitchell majority arrived at its rule by grounding 
its analysis in well-settled bankruptcy philosophy& and by 
.1. In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.) (per Schroeder, J., with whom Goodwin, J., 
joined; Noonan, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992). 
2. Id. at 560. While its immediate concern was the valuation of a car, Mitchell 
should apply to most cases where valuation standards are at issue and the debtor pro-
poses to retain the property which has been used as collateral to secure an indebtedness. 
See In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1991), infra notes 116-26 and accompanying 
text; but see In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, _ U.S. _, 
1992 WL 303365 (Dec. 7, 1992), infra note 55. 
The Bankruptcy Code does not use the terms secured or unsecured "creditors." 
Rather, it refers to creditor's "claims" against a debtor as either secured or unsecured. 11 
U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5863, 6312; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854. The term "claim" is defined as a right to payment or a 
right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a 
right to payment. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988). 
3. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560. 
4. Id.; see also In re Wabash Valley Power Assoc., 77 B.R. 991 (Bankr. S.D. In. 
1987). For the Ninth Circuit's definition of going concern, and a comparison with other 
commentators' definitions, infra note 107. 
5. Commentators and courts have identified two primary purposes of bankruptcy 
law. First, bankruptcy hopes to provide debtors with a "fresh start" through a discharge 
9 
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strictly construing the structure of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) in accord 
with its legislative history.s 
II. FACTS 
Mitchell's7 facts revolve around the commonplace purchase 
of a new family car. On January 14, 1987 George and Carol 
Mitchell signed a conditional sales contract for a 1987 Cadillac 
EI Dorado.s They paid a $5,000.00 down payment and agreed to 
pay sixty monthly installments of $585.00 plus an annual inter-
est rate of eleven percent.s Thus, upon full performance of the 
contract, the Mitchells would pay $31,940.00 for the Cadillac.10 
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (hereinafter "GMAC") 
claimed that pursuant to the contract, it retained a security in-
of indebtedness. Second, bankruptcy law tries to create an equitable arrangement of the 
rights of creditors where there are not enough assets of a debtor to be distributed in full 
satisfaction of all creditors' claims. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 754, 659 (1991) (quoting 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934»; In re Stewart, 14 B.R. 959, 961 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Mensch, 7 B.R. 805, 806 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also 
In re Britton, 950 F.2d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 1991); H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
n (1973); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 117-18, 125 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6077-78, 6086; THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAW 3-4, 225-52 (1986); see also generally Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start 
Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1985). 
6. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 11 506.03, at 506-5 to 506-14 (15th ed. 1992) [hereinaf-
ter 3 COLLIER); infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text discussing the legislative history 
of Section 506(a). 
7. In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992). 
8. Id. at 558. 
9.Id. 
10. Id. The purchase price included accessories and a sixty-month, unlimited mile-
age mechanical service contract. A debate outside the scope of this article arose in 
Mitchell over this service contract. General Motors Acceptance Corporation contended 
that the value of the contract added to the value of the car, thus it should be included in 
the car's value under any standard of valuation. Appellant's Opening Brief at 26-28, 
Mitchell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.) (No. 90-15952), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief). 
In opposition, the Mitchells argued that the service contract was not the proper 
subject of a security interest under either California law or the Bankruptcy Code, that at 
trial GMAC failed to claim a security interest in the service contract, its premiums or 
proceeds, and that GMAC failed to assert that the value of the service contract enhanced 
the value of the vehicle. Appellees' Responding Brief at 44-47, Mitchell v. General Mo-
tors Acceptance Corp., 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.) (No. 90-15952), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 
303 (1992) [hereinafter Appellees' Responding Brief). 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the debtors and held that the value of the contract 
was not to be included in the total value of the car under any standard, because the 
service contract did not contain language granting GMAC a security interest. Mitchell, 
954 F.2d at 561. 
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terest in the vehicle, all parts and accessories thereon, all insur-
ance premiums financed by the seller, and all service contract 
premiums financed by the seller.ll 
On March 4, 1988, the Mitchells filed for protection under 
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.12 Their reorganization plan, 
confirmed by the bankruptcy court on May 11, 1988, offered to 
pay one hundred percent of the value of their creditors' allowed 
secured claims, and ten percent of their creditors' allowed un-
secured claims.13 
GMAC filed a claim as a secured creditor of the Cadillac 
and asserted that its allowed claim in the value of the EI Dorado 
should be $27,062.25.14 The Mitchells objected and the bank-
ruptcy court held a hearing to determine the value. HI In the en-
suing battle of appraisers, two distinct positions emerged. The 
debtors' expert testified that the Cadillac had a value of 
$20,761.00 on March 4, 1988, the date they filed their petition, 
while GMAC's appraiser, using the same market guide as the 
Mitchells' expert, testified that the vehicle had a value on that 
day of $24,185.00.16 The $3,424.00 difference resulted from the 
11. Supra note 10. 
12. Id. at 559. Chapter 13 contains the provisions for reorganization of the debts of 
individuals with less than $100,000.00 in noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts and 
less than $350,000.00 in noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) 
(1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988). Chapter 13 is used by individual wage earners 
with regular income and small sole proprietors for whom Chapter 11 reorganization is too 
cumbersome. In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 1991); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th 
Congo 1st Sess. 310 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6277. 
The Bankruptcy Code also contains provisions for liquidation of an individual's 
debts and equity in non-exempt assets under Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988). 
Reorganizations are provided for municipalities under Chapter 9. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) 
(1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946 (1988). Business entities can file for protection against cred-
itors while liquidating their assets under Chapter 7 or reorganizing their debt burden 
under Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d) (1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988); 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1101-1174 (1988). Family farmers with regular annual income qualify as debtors 
under Chapter 12. 11 U.S.C. § 109(0, (g) (1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1231 (1988). 
13. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. Both appraisers used the Kelley Blue Book valuation guide to arrive at their 
respective figures. This type of evidence of value is used routinely in bankruptcy courts 
to establish a vehicle's value, at times in conjuction with expert testimony and also 
standing alone. See Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559; Memphis Bank & Trust CO. V. Walker, 14 
B.R. 264, 265 (D.C. W.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
1980); see also S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1983) ("The Committee ... 
encourages reference to trade publications as appropriate indicia of the market value of 
3
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debtors' appraiser's reliance on the wholesale value, while the 
creditor's appraiser relied on the retail value contained in the 
valuation guide for the year and make Cadillac in question. 17 
The bankruptcy court found that GMAC's position should 
prevail and the Mitchells appealed. 18 The Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel reversed in favor of the debtors, and GMAC in turn filed 
an appeal with the Ninth Circuit.19 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) AND 1325 
1. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) 
An understanding of the well-settled precepts of valuation 
under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) is a prerequisite to understanding the 
various valuation standards used in bankruptcy proceedings.IlO 
For instance, the value of an item used to secure an indebted-
ness can change throughout a single bankruptcy proceeding, and 
no determination of value is binding upon a debtor or creditor if 
it becomes necessary to make a subsequent determination of the 
value of the same piece of property at a later time.1l1 
The first sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) provides that: 
[a]n allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien 
on property in which the estate has an interest, or 
that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this 
title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value 
of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest 
in such property, or to the extent of the amount 
the property 'in question." (cited in 3 COLLIER, ~ 506.03, at 506·13 to 506·14». 
17. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559. 
18.Id. 
19. Id.; Mitchell v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., (In re Mitchell), BAP No. 
NC·89·1222·JVAs, Amended Memorandum, (9th Cir. BAP June 15, 1990). 
20. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). 
21. S. REPT. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5854; 3 COLLIER ~ 506.04 at 506·25, n.22; see also David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors 
and the Eely Nature of Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 63, 66·70 (1991) 
[hereinafter Carlson, Secured Creditors]; James F. Queenan, Standards for Valuation of 
Security Interests in Chapter II, 92 COM. L.J. 18, 25·28 (1987) [hereinafter Queenan, 
Standards for Valuation]; Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Valuation in 
Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1062·63 (1985) [hereinafter Fortgang & Mayer, Val· 
uation in Bankruptcy]. 
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subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an 
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of 
such creditor's interest or the amount so subject 
to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed 
claim.li 
13 
This first sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) thus divides a se-
cured debt into two claims, one secured and the other un-
secured.2s Each bifurcated claim is treated throughout the pen-
dency of the bankruptcy case as "separate and independent" 
components of the original indebtedness.2• 
The division of a claim into secured and unsecured portions 
under '11 U.S.C. § 506 is valid "only for the purpose for which 
the determination is made."2& Thus, the standard of valuation 
can change depending on the purpose of the valuation.26 For ex-
ample, value of property that is exempt from being used to sat-
isfy creditors' claims is defined as the "fair market value as of 
the date of the filing of the petition."27 Similarly, when a Chap-
ter 7 debtor tries to redeem collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 722, the 
value of the item is the price the debtor would pay to replace 
the item: its present fair market value (or the amount of the 
claim if the claim is less than fair market value).28 
22. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). 
23. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6085: 
To the extent of the value of the security interest, [the se-
cured creditor] is treated as having a secured claim, entitled to 
be paid in full under the plan, unless, of course, he accepts less 
than full payment. To the extent that his claim against the 
debtor exceeds the value of his collateral, he is treated as hav-
ing an unsecured claim, and he will receive payment along 
with all other general unsecured creditors. 
See 3 COLLIER ~ 506.04, at 506-15 to 506-16; Jeffrey K. Robison, The Debtor's Right to 
Restrict Lienholder Recovery to the Value of the Encumbered Property Under Section 
506 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 J. CORP. L. 433, 435 (1986); supra note 2. 
24. 3 COLLIER, ~ 506.04 at 506-15; see also In re Lopez-Soto, 764 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 
1985); Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981). 
25. 124 CONGo REC. S17411 (daily ed. October 6, 1978). 
26. 124 CONGo REC. Hll095 (daily ed. September 28, 1978) ("A valuation early in the 
case in a proceeding under sections 361-363 would not be binding upon the debtor or 
creditor at the time of confirmation of the plan."). 
27. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (1988); In re Walsh, 5 B.R. 239, 240 (1981). 
28. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 722 (1988); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5881; see also In re Mcquinn, 6 B.R. 899, 900 (Bankr. D. 
Nb. 1980) ("[T]he retail value of the collateral includes costs'such as dealer overhead, 
salesperson's commissions, and profit which the debtor should not be required to 
5
Clark: Bankruptcy Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
14 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:9 
By contrast, where a secured creditor requests relief from 
stay under 11 u.s.C. § 362, the wholesale value of an item given 
as security is used to determine whether the creditor's interest is 
adequately protected; relief is granted if the wholesale value of 
the collateral is less than the amount owed to the creditor.29 
The second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) describes how 
valuation is to be done: Congress mandated that goods given to 
secure payment or performance are to be valued "in light of the 
purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of 
the property involved." [emphasis added)S° The phrasing of the 
second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) has led courts to use in-
consistent valuation standards in determining the allowed 
amounts of secured claims on vehicles in Chapter 13 plans.31 
The valuation standards courts have used include retail value,32 
"open market value,"33 the amount realized by the creditor upon 
foreclosure and sale,34 the wholesale/average trade-in value,3C1 
and liquidation value.36 
Counsel for debtors and creditors have contributed to the 
confusion as to what standard of valuation properly implements 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a) by their partisan arguments emphasizing ei-
pay .... "). 
29. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988); see also In re Lackow, 16 B.R. 566, 570 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 1981), aff'd, 22 B.R. 1018 (D. Fla. 1982). 
30. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); In re Lopez-Soto, 764 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1985); 
Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981); see also 3 COLLIER, ~ 
506.04 at 506-15; John B. Butler, III, Valuation of Secured Claims Under 11 U.S.C. 
506(a) , 89 COM. L.J. 342, 343-44 nn.17-20 (1984). 0 
31. In re Smith, 42 B.R. 198, 200 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 
875 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (wholesale value); In re Reynolds, 17 B.R. 489, 493 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ga. 1981) (retail replacement cost). 
32. Reynolds, 17 B.R. at 493. 
33. In re Beranek, 9 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); In re Miller 4 B.R. 392, 
394 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980) ("[TJhe median value between retail and wholesale values 
would most accurately approximate that open maket value .... "). 
34. In re Stumbo, 7 B.R. 939 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981). 
35. In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 875 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) ("[WJhere the collateral is a 
car and the secured claimant does not present evidence on its usual commercially reason-
able method of selling cars, courts have presumed that the value of the car is the whole-
sale value shown by industry used car guides."); see also In re Van Nort, 9 B.R. 218, 221 
(Bankr. E.D. Mi. 1981); In re Jones, 5 B.R. 736, 738 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); In re Crock-
ett, 3 B.R. 365, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). Compare Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Walker, 14 B.R. 264, 265 (D.C.W.D. Tenn. 1981). 
36. In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc., 18 B.R. 29, 32-33 (Bankr. D. Me. 
1982). 
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ther the first or second phrase of its second sentence.37 As a re-
sult, counsel's partisan and adversarial approach to bankruptcy 
litigation has sometimes led bankruptcy courts to analyze 11 
U.S.C. § 506(a) as if it contained the disjunctive "or" rather 
than the conjunction "and."38 
Counsel for creditors emphasize the use of a high valuation 
standard (such as retail value), and tend to support this position 
by guiding the courts to the second phrase of the second sen-
tence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Le. "in light of ... the proposed 
dispostion and use").39 By implication, a creditor's standard for 
valuing vehicles in Chapter 13 cases would be based primarily 
upon whether or not the debtor proposed to retain and use the 
vehicle. 
Debtors' attorneys, on the other hand, focus almost exclu-
sively on the first phrase of the second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 
506(a) (Le. "in light of the purpose of the valuation"), and use it 
to promote the use of a lower standard, for example, the collat-
eral's wholesale value.40 This approach implies that the control-
37. In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 248-51 (4th Cir. 1991); see also In re Claeys, 81 B.R. 
985, 990-91 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987): 
[AJ valuation is made ... it seems, upon the emphasis given to 
the first and second sentences of section 506(a). The first sen-
tence, providing that the claim is secured to the extent of the 
value of the creditor's interest in the property, suggests that 
since it is the creditor's interest that is being valued and not 
the collateral itself, it should not make any difference whether 
the debtor is retaining the property. Yet, the language of the 
second sentence suggests that the proposed disposition or use 
of the collateral itself must be considered when determining 
that value. 
Counsel for the Mitchells and for GMAC aligned themselves according to this 
debtor-creditor dichotomy. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-17, Mitchell (No. 90-15952); 
Appellees' Responding Brief at 20-22, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). The greatest strength in 
the Ninth Circuit's approach to the valuation issue lies in the court's ability to find a 
balance between the two positions. 
38. Infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
39. See In re 222 Liberty Assocs. 105 B.R. 798, 803 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re 
Courtright, 57 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986); see also In re Usry, 106 B.R. 759, 761 
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989). 
40. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560; In re Smith, 92 B.R. 198, 200 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984) 
("[IJt is the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in property which must be val-
ued."); In re Boring, 91 B.R. 791, 794 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ("Most courts recognize 
that the debtor's proposed retention and use of collateral does not emasculate the fact 
that it is in the first instance the creditor's interest in the collateral that must be 
valued."). 
7
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ling event in the valuation process is the purpose of the valua-
tion. However, both phrases from 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) must be 
used in the valuation process along with 11 U.S.C. § 1325. 
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 
This section sets forth the requirements that must be satis-
fied for a debtor's Chapter 13 reorganization plan to be con-
firmed. 41 Toward this goal, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) provides that: 
(a) except as provided in subsection (b), the court 
shall confirm a plan if -
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim 
provided by the plan -
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the 
plan; 
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such 
claim retain the lien securing the claim; and 
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, 
of property to be distributed under the plan on 
account of such claim is not less than the allowed 
amount of such claim . . . .42 
Thus, 11 U.S.C. § 1325 uses the amount of the secured cred-
itor's claim to establish the minimum amount to be paid to the 
creditor through the Chapter 13 reorganization plan.4s The 
amount of the secured claim is to be determined under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(a)," which defines in its first sentence the value of a credi-
tor's allowed secured claim as "the creditor's interest in the es-
tate's interest in the property."411 
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1978), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5928; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6385 . 
. 42. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A), (a)(5)(B)(i), (a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988). 
43. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559; 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988); supra note 42. 
44. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 430 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 638S. 
4S. 11 U.S.C. § S06(a) (1988); In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 873 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984): 
The purpose of the collateral valuation under Section 
132S(a)(5)(B)(ii) is not to assume that secured claimants will 
receive under the plan as much money as debtors would have 
to spend to replace the collateral. Instead, the purpose of col-
lateral valuation under Section 132S(a)(S)(B)(ii) is to protect 
secured claimants from loss by assuring that they will receive 
under the plan as much money, or its equivalent, as they 
8
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The interplay of 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and 1325(a)(5) requires 
a court to place a value on property of the bankruptcy estate 
before a plan of rehabilitation is confirmed.·8 Creditors must 
show that the estate has an interest in the property used by the 
debtor as collateral.·7 Then the nature (i.e. fee, leasehold, joint 
tenancy) of the estate's interest in the property must be dis-
closed.'s Finally, the court must determine the standard of valu-
ation to accurately calculate the value of the creditor's allowed 
secured claim,,9 : 
Participants in a Chapter 13 proceeding must use both 
phrases of the second sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) to deter-
mine what standard of valuation is to be used in placing a value 
on property used as collateral. Thus the purpose of the valuation 
is established under 11 U.S.C. § 1325 and then the proposed dis-
position and use of the property securing the debtor's obligation 
to the creditor is considered.IIO . 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) 
The Bankruptcy Code ll1 does not define the term "value."112 
Likewise, it contains no specific directive on what standards of 
valuation to use in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. How-
ever, courts must define both value and valuation 'standards on a 
case-by -case basis. liS 
One approach to defining these key elements of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding has been to use 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) in conjunc-
would receive if they were permitted to sell the collateral in a 
commercially reasonable manner. 
See also In re Malody, 102 B.R. 745, 750 (9th Cir. BAP 1989) and infra notes 70-91 
and accompanying text discussing Malody. 
46. Supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
47. 3 COLLIER, 11 506.04 at 506-17 to 506-18. 
48.Id. 
49.Id. 
50. In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). 
51. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-353 (1984). 
52. 11 U.S.C. § 101(1}-(61) (1988). 
53. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5854; RR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6312. 
9
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tion with other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.1I4 This inter-
play between chapters of the Bankruptcy Code is done 
frequently in order to achieve consistent application in analo-
gous situations.1I1I 
Reliance on legislative history is the second method used to 
define value under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).116 The report of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary regarding proposed amendments to 
the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 contains the definitive source of 
congressional intent regarding the meaning and use of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(a).117 The House report stated that: 
'[v]alue' does not necessarily contemplate forced 
sale or liquidation value of the collateral; nor does 
it always imply a full going concern value. Courts 
will have to determine value on a case-by-case ba-
54. For example, Chapter 13 cases often refer to Chapter 12 cases in valuation is-
sues. See In re Malody, 102 B.R. 745,748-49 (9th Cir. BAP 1989)(citing In re Courtright, 
57 B.R. 495 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986»; see also United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of 
Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 108 S. Ct. 626, 630 (1988) (drawing an analogy between 
the use of the phrase "interest in property" in 11 U.S.C. § 362 and its use in 11 U.S.C. § 
506(a». 
The Bankruptcy Code facilitates and encourages such comparisons and analogies. 
For instance, the wording of 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(i),(ii) and 11 U.S.C. §1 
325(a)(5)(B)(i), (ii) are identical, thus making comparisons between the results in 
one section applicable to similar situations under the other; see supra note 41 and ac-
companying text. 
The limits to using results under one chapter of the Code within the context of a 
case arising under another chapter are contained in sections 102 and 103. 11 U.S.C. §§ 
102(8), 103(a)-(i) (1988). 
55. In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, _ U.s. _, 
(1992); 1992 WL 303365 (Dec. 7, 1992). Nobleman represents the possible outer limits of 
Mitchell's analytical approach. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Nobleman in 
order to settle a conflict between circuits on the issue of whether homeowners may use 11 
U.S.C. § 506(a) and Chapter 13 to bifurcate mortgages on principal residences. Permit-
ting this approach would allow debtors to satisfy debts on their home mortgages at less 
than bargained for prices. 
However, tension exists in this situation between 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a) and 1322(b)(2). 
The latter section precludes debtors from modifying the terms of mortgages on principal 
residences. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1322(b)(2) (1988); Nobleman, 968 F.2d 485-89; see also 
Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 775 (1992); In re Houghland, 886 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
If the Court ultimately holds in Nobleman that the interplay between 11 U.S.C. §§ 
506(a) and 1322(b)(2) is controlled by the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), the Mitchell 
approach will in effect have been extended to the home mortgage arena. 
56. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559; Appellant's Opening Brief at 23-25, Mitchell (No. 90- .' 
15952); Appellees' Responding Brief at 6-16, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). 
57. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.N. 
6312. 
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sis, taking into account the facts of each case and 
the competing interests in the case . . . :i8 
19 
The Senate Committee Report on the companion bill fur-
ther explained the use and approach to value under 11 U.S.C. § 
506(a).1i9The Senate Committee stated that: 
[w]hile courts will have to determine value on a 
case-by-case basis, the subsection makes it clear 
that valuation is to be determined in light of the 
purpose of the valuation and the proposed dispo-
sition or use of the subject property. This deter-
mination shall be made in conjunction with any 
hearing on such disposition or use of property or 
on a plan affecting the creditor's interest.8o 
In 1981, the Senate reviewed the Bankruptcy Code for fur-
ther refinements and adjustments. The Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee issued a report81 which described the reasons for the vari-
ous proposals for changes in the Code. The Committee proposed 
to amend 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and establish a preference for the 
use of a resale market standard "with the choice of wholsale 
[sic] or retail measurements of value to be determined by refer-
ence to the condition of the property and the debtor's proposed 
use or disposition thereof."82 Thus the first sentence of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(a) would be deleted and replaced with a "reference" to the 
condition of the property, and the creditor's half of the second 
sentence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) would be retained and dominate 
the valuation analysis. 
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary proposed these 
changes because, in the Committee's view: 
58.Id. 
[C]ourts have, in too many cases, undervalued 
collateral property to an extent which denies ade-
quate protection to secured creditors. Problems of 
proof which creditors face are compounded by ju-
59. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 UoSoCoCoA.No 
58540 
600Ido 
61. S. REP. Noo 65, 98th Congo, 1st Sess., 5-6 (1983) (cited in 3 COLLIER, 11 506003 at 
506-13 to 506-14)0 
62.Ido 
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dicial confusion over what standard should be 
employed - wholesale or retail, resale or straight 
line depreciation. Many courts have fixated upon 
wholesale resale at [sic] the appropriate standard, 
even for property with a high resale value in the 
retail market. Whereas the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act sought to encourage valuation on a case-by-
case basis in focusing on the proposed use of the 
property in question as a determinant factor, the 
original intent of the Congress in this regard has 
not uniformly been carried into practice by the 
courts.6S 
[Vol. 23:9 
However, when Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code, it 
included only a few of the amendments suggested by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.6• The rejected proposals included the 
changes to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).611 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
Counsel of record for both sides in the Mitchell66 dispute 
aligned themselves according to the debtor-creditor dichotomy 
and obtained different results when they applied 11 U.S.C. § 
506(a) to their renditions of the facts.67 Thus, when the bank-
ruptcy court entered its order for relief, GMAC's lien totalled 
$27,062.25. The debtors' valuation under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) left 
GMAC with a secured claim of $20,761.00 (the wholesale value 
of the Cadillac) and an unsecured claim of $6,301.25.68 This lat-
63.Id. 
64. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98·353 (1984). 
65. 3 COLLIER, 11 506.02 at 505-12. Using failed proposals for legislation to divine 
legislative intent carries some risk because there is no record regarding why the legisla-
tors voted against the legislation. However, when GMAC appeared before the Ninth Cir-
cuit in the Mitchell case, its argument emphasized the proposed use or disposition of the 
collateral. This is the same reasoning that appeared in the Senate Committee's report in 
favor of amending 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). GMAC thus put itself into the position of appear-
ing to ask the court to legislate where Congress had refused to do so, and lessened the 
Mitchells' burden of proving legislative intent from failed legislation. See Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 9-26, Mitc,.,ell (No. 90-15952); Appellees' Responding Brief at 14-16, 
Mitchell (No. 90-15952). 
66. In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992). 
67. Appellant's Opening Brief at 9, 13, Mitchell (No. 90-15952); Appellees' Re-
sponding Brief at 16-19, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). 
68. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/7
1993] BANKRUPTCY LAW 21 
ter claim under the Mitchells' proposed plan would only be paid 
at only ten percent of its value, a total of about $630.00. Accord-
ingly, GMAC would receive $21,391.00, plus interest, usi~g the 
Mitchells' valuation. 
In contrast, GMAC asserted that under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) it 
had a secured claim of $24,185.00 (the retail value of the vehi-
cle), leaving only $2,877.25 unsecured to be paid at ten percent 
of its value, or approximately $287.73.69 Therefore, GMAC 
would receive $24,472.73, plus interest, under its valuation, a 
difference of $3,081.00 before interest. 
A. MAJORITY 
The Mitchell decision relied heavily on the analysis and 
holding of In re Malady,70 and affirmed Malady's analytical ap-
proach. The Ninth Circuit specifically noted in Mitchell that 
Malady stood as the leading Ninth Circuit case on valuation 
standards, and approved its holding.71 Thus, a clear understand-
ing of Malady is necessary to understand Mitchell fully. 
In Malady, the debtors bargained with a single creditor, 
Valley National Bank (VNB), in two separate transactions for 
the purchase of two vehicles.72 Under the terms of the first 
purchase, the Bank loaned the Malodys $9,739.19 and retained a 
perfected security interest in a 1985 Ford Tempo.73 The 
Malodys received the car and agreed to make monthly install-
ment payments on the principal, plus interest. 
The second transaction occurred six months later. VNB 
agreed to loan the Malodys $18,383.34 toward the purchase of a 
1986 Ford Bronco II in exchange for a perfected security interest 
in the vehicle.H 
Eighteen months later, the Malodys filed for protection 
69. [d. 
70. 102 B.R. 745 (9th Cir. BAP 1989). 
71. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560. 
72. Malady. 102 B.R. at 746. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. 
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under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.711 As of the date of 
their request for an order for relief, the Malodys owed VNB 
$6,457.75 for the Tempo, and $15,902.10 for the Bronco and val-
ued both vehicles at their wholesale values.78 They filed their 
plan concurrently with their voluntary petition, giving them 
thirty days from the date of their request for an order for relief 
to begin making payments to creditors in comformance with 
their plan for reorganization.77 
The Malodys argued that the collateral should be valued at 
the amount a creditor would receive upon repossessing and sell-
ing the vehicles.78 VNB argued that because the debtors retained 
possession of the vehicles, the value of the creditor's claim is the 
replacement cost to the debtors or, alternatively, the going con-
cern value because "their retention adds to the estate by assist-
ing in the effectuation of the debtors' Plan."79 
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Malody rejected the 
creditor's position on four grounds. First, valuation for the pur-
pose of confirming a Chapter 13 plan under 11 U.S.C. § 
1325(a)(5)(b)(ii) is to "protect a secured claimant from loss by 
assuring that it will receive as much money under the plan as it 
would receive if it were permitted to sell the vehicles in a com-
mercially reasonable manner," and because the debtors' replace-
ment cost is not an accurate reflection of this amount.80 
Second, because the vehicles in Malody were not essential 
to the successful completion of the debtors' plan, replacement 
value would not be the appropriate measure of value.81 An ex-
ample of collateral that can be essential to an effective reorgani-
zation is farm land that produces crops from which the debtors 
can generate income which in turn is used to service their debt.82 
75. Id.; supra note 12. 
76. Malady, 102 B.R. at 746. 
77. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(l) (1988). 
78. Malady, 102 B.R. at 747. 
79.Id. 
80. Id. at 749 (citing In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 873 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984»; see In re 
Petry, 76 B.R. 651, 653 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987); Memphis Bank & Trust Co., 14 B.R. 264, 
265 (D.C.W.D. Tenn. 1981); In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657,660 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re 
Van Nort, 9 B.R. 218, 220-21 (Bankr. E.D. Mi. 1981). 
81. Malady, 102 B.R. at 749. 
82. In re Courtright, 57 B.R. 495, 497-98 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986). 
14
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/7
1993] BANKRUPTCY LAW 23 
However, crops are dissimilar to the type of collateral in the 
Mitchell case. Collateral which is closer to that found in Malady 
and Mitchell is the situation where a debtor. grants a security 
interest in farm machinery that is used for the production of a 
debtor's income after bankruptcy.s3 
In both of these examples the property voluntarily encum-
bered by the debtor is part of an ongoing business and more 
than just incidental to the production of income by the debtors. 
Under these circumstances, according to Malady and Mitchell, 
the replacement/retail value of the collateral is the proper stan-
dard of valuation of the secured creditor's claim. However, the 
vehicles involved in Malady and Mitchell did not produce in-
come; thus both courts applied the wholesale value of the vehi-
cles as the standard to determine the creditors' allowed claims. 
The Malady court's third reason for holding replacement 
value as an inappropriate standard focused on the fact that the 
risk that creditors take in extending credit is ignored: if a debtor 
defaults the creditor must repossess the collateral and sell it at a 
value less than retail value.s4 
Finally, Malady noted that in the context of confirmation of 
Chapter 13 plans, valuation balances the pressure on the debtor 
to pay the secured creditor under threat of repossession by en-
suring that the creditor receives only what it could receive upon 
repossession and resale.slI Citing the 1977 House Report of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, Malady noted that: 
[t]he [secured] creditor obtains a security interest 
in all of the debtor's furniture, clothes, cooking 
utensils, and other personal effects. These items 
have little or no resale value. They do, however 
have a high replacement cost. The mere threat of 
repossession operates as pressure on the debtor to 
83. In re Sprecher, 65 B.R. 598, 599-601 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986). 
84. Malady, 102 B.R. at 750. 
85.Id. 
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pay the secured creditor more than he would re-
ceive were he actually to repossess and sell the 
goods.86 
[Vol. 23:9 
If retail/replacement value were used as the standard of val-
uation of a vehicle, this balance between the true value of collat-
eral and its value as leverage for the creditor would be unbal-
anced to the point that debtors would be unable to obtain the 
fresh financial start that bankruptcy tries to offer.87· 
The Mitchell majority approved of this analysis, but added 
no additional comment or critique.88 Instead, Mitchell, like 
Malody, started its analysis of valuation standards by focusing 
on two phrases of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a): an allowed claim of a se-
cured creditor "is a secured claim to the extent of the value of 
such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such prop-
erty,"89 and that "such value shall be determined in light of the 
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use 
of such property."90 Both Malody and Mitchell then examine 
these phrases in the inverse order in which they appear in the 
statute. Starting with the latter, both courts focused on the leg-
islative history behind these contradicting statements.91 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the purpose of the valuation 
needed to be examined and it established this purpose as the 
need to confirm a Chapter 13 plan.92 The court then noted that 
fulfilling this purpose required compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 
86. [d.; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1977); Appellees' Responding 
Brief at 12, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). In its Opening Brief, GMAC severly criticized the 
use of this passage by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Malody. Appellant's Opening 
Brief at 23-26, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). GMAC argued that because the quoted text re-
fers only to household goods and not vehicles, it does not apply to the latter items. [d. 
The Mitchells' counter argument, however, contained a cogent point: there is noth-
ing in the House report to indicate that the method of valuing secured claims is depen-
dent on the type of collateral or that Congress intended to distinguish between house-
hold goods and cars. Appellees' Responding Brief at 12, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). 
Presumably, if Congress intended such a distinction, it would have made it. 
87. Malody, 102 B.R. at 749-50. 
88. The Mitchell decision is so bereft of independent reasoning that GMAC focused 
its criticism on the analysis contained in Malody. Appellant's Opening Brief at 17 n.18, 
Mitchell (No. 90-15952). 
89. 11 U.S.C. § 506(8) (1988); Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559. 
90. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988); Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559. 
91. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559-60; Malody, 102 B.R. at 748. 
92. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559-60. 
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1325.93 
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the first sentence of 11 
U.S.C. § 506(a) and analyzed the purpose of the valuation in or-
der to establish the relative interests at stake.9• Finding that the 
purpose of the valuation is satisfied if the creditor's interest in 
the collateral is protected, the Court posed the question of what 
. is included in the creditor's interest.9& In the case of a debtor 
who proposes to retain a vehicle under a Chapter 13 plan of re-
organization, the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the 
vehicle is· the amount that the creditor would receive in a com-
mercially reasonable sale of the vehicle.96 Evidence having been 
heard in the Mitchell lower court proceedings that a commer-
cially reasonable sale in the automobile context is an auction at-
tended only by automobile dealers,97 and that the price normally 
received at such an auction is the wholesale price,9s the Ninth 
Circuit held that the valuation standard to be applied under the 
facts of Mitchell is the wholesale price.9s 
At first glance, this result appears to vindicate· the Mitch-
ell's position completely. However, the Ninth Circuit's decision 
can be divided into two parts: that which debtors will support 
and that which creditors will approve. 
The pro~debtor nature of the Mitchell decision is found in 
the Ninth Circuit's support for the view expressed by a majority 
of lower courts which rejects an "across-the-board" application 
of a retail standard in every case where a creditor's interest in a 
vehicle needs to be evaluated.loo The Ninth Circuit thus ap-
93.Id. 
94.Id. 
95.Id. 
96.Id. 
97. Appellees' Responding Brief at 26, Mitchell (No. 90-15952). 
98. Id.; see also In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981): 
At the valuation hearing ... an employee of GMAC testified 
as to GMAC's procedure for disposing of abandoned and re-
possessed cars. [The employee] stated that [repossessed] cars 
are sold on a "bid" market. Although [the employee] did not 
elaborate on this method of sale, it is evident that this proce-
dure clearly contemplates a wholesale market value as op-
posed to a retail or forced-sale (liquidation) market value. 
99. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560. 
100. Id.; Queenan, Standards for Valuation, supra note 21, at 30. 
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proved a line of decisions which define value from the perspec-
tive of what collateral is worth in the hands of creditors after 
foreclosure and a commercially reasonable sale.101 By implica-
tion, the court disapproved decisions which establish value of 
collateral by looking to the debtor's cost of replacing property in 
which they have granted an interest to a creditor and which the 
debtor proposes to retain in a Chapter 13 financial 
reorganization. lo2 
Mitchell is a "pro-debtor" decision in most of the bank-
ruptcy cases to which it may be applied. The court assigned the 
wholesale value to the Cadillac, the lowest value asserted as ap-
plicable. The vast majority of Chapter 13 reorganizations are 
used by individuals to reorganize consumer debt. loa Their vehi-
cles are not part of a going business concern and do not contrib-
ute to a successful reorganization, thus most Chapter 13 debtors 
will pay only wholesale value of a vehicle through their plan in 
reliance on Mitchell. 
However, Mitchell becomes a "pro-creditor" decision in 
those instances where a creditor can show that a Chapter 13 
debtor's vehicle is used for more than mere transportation, and 
is in fact used as part of a going concern.104 If the vehicle. con-
tributes to a debtor's livelihood, and the debtor proposes to re-
tain the vehicle, the cost to the debtor of replacing the vehicle 
will be its value. As a result, the allowed claim of the secured 
creditor will increase, and the debtor's fresh start after bank-
ruptcy will be predicated on satisfying a much larger obligation. 
At the same time, however, the Ninth Circuit's caveat re-
garding vehicles used in a going concern suggests that the appli-
cation of the wholesale value is to be applied only under particu-
lar facts. lOll In the Mitchell court's view, vehicles used by a 
debtor in a manner that is particularly beneficial to the debtor 
or that is particularly detrimental to the vehicle's value requires 
101. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560 . 
. 102. [d.; see also Queenan, Standards for Valuation, supra note 21, at 30. 
103. 3 COLLIER, '\I 506.04 at 506·26 n.25; Bankruptcy Filings Increase 22 Percent, 22 
Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) Weekly News & Comment No. 15, at A7 to All (January 16, 
1992). 
104. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560. 
105. Id. 
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the use of the replacement or "retail" standard of valuation. lOS 
Thus the definition of a going concern which can be extrapo-
lated from Mitchell is an' activity that assists the debtor in his 
financial recovery by producing income or an activity that 
threatens the value of the collateral. lo7 
B. DISSENT 
The Mitchell dissent agreed with the conclusion reached by 
the bankruptcy court. Judge Noonan noted that "[t]he key fact 
is that the debtor is going to use the car."I08 Accordingly, be-
cause the debtors' proposed disposition of the vehicle is to retain 
it for their use, and the debtors cannot sell the vehicle at whole-
sale, the cost of the debtors replacing the car is its value. This 
figure corresponds to the highest figure in the automobile valua-
tion guide. loe 
The dissent thus emphasizes not just the fact that the debt-
ors are retaining the subject vehicle, but that it is to be retained 
106. Id. 
107. Id. Other commentators and jurists have developed alternative definitions of 
"going concern." See In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 875 n.ll (Bankr. D. Utah 1984): 
Property is sometimes said to have a going concern value. This 
expression has at least two meanings. First, going concern 
value may refer to property which can be sold for a higher 
price as inventory of an ongoing business than if sold by a 
closed or closing business .... Second, going concern value 
may mean that the debtor can use the property to generate 
income greater than the price for which the property could be 
sold. An example of this meaning could be tools used by a 
mechanic to produce income greater than the price which 
could be obtained at a sale in the used tool market .... Using 
this meaning when valuing a consumer's car, however, is artifi-
cial. It is not the use of the car that generates income for a 
Chapter 13 debtor who uses the car to drive to and from work. 
It is the services of the debtor unrelated to the use of the car 
that generate income. Thus to say that a car used to drive to 
and from work has a going concern value makes little sense. 
See also Carlson, Secured Creditors, supra note 21, at 87-91 (discussing problems of 
allocating value to individual pieces of equipment used in a going concern). 
Possibly the most straightforward definition of "going concern" is "a business with 
some sort of future." See Fortgang and Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, supra note 21, 
at 1063-66 (citing FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS § 
B05.103 (1984) and G. NEWTON, BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACCOUNTING: PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURES 500-01 (2d ed. 1981». 
108. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 561. 
109. Id.; supra note 16. 
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and used by the debtors, making their successful reorganization 
more likely by assisting in the production of income that will be 
used to fund the debtors' Chapter 13 plan. 
IV. CRITIQUE 
Mitchell's contribution to bankruptcy law rests in two ar-
eas. First, the Ninth Circuit avoided the partisan positions that 
influenced some lower courts. The court adhered to the plain 
language of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and concentrated on the conjunc-
tive word "and" rather than altering it to the disjunctive word 
"or." The court also used 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) in tandem with 11 
U.S.C. § 1325 to find the purpose of the valuation (i.e. plan con-
firmation), and carefully noted that the interest to be valued was 
the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in the collateral. 
The Ninth Circuit in Mitchell thus provided the lower courts 
and bankruptcy practitioners with an invaluable lesson in statu-
tory interpretation. 
Second, the court's acknowledgment that collateral used in 
a going concern should be valued by a standard other than 
wholesale value stands as a guide to the use of legislative his-
tory. By emphasizing that different fact patterns can lead to dif-
ferent results, the Ninth Circuit in Mitchell followed Congress's 
instruction to conduct valuation of collateral in bankruptcy on a 
case-by-case basis. 
The Ninth Circuit in Mitchell sought to reconcile the vari-
ous approaches to valuation by holding that the creditor's inter-
est in the collateral is what is being valued, and wholesale value 
best approximates the dollar amount of this interest.llo How-
ever, the court also held that replacement cost to the debtor (i.e. 
retail value) controls valuation of vehicles where the contem-
plated use by the debtor of the vehicle is as part of a going 
concern.llI 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Mitchell affirmed the ap-
proach taken by a majority of lower courts from both the Ninth 
and other circuits. It also affirmed the legislature's intent that 
110. In re Mitchell, 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992). 
111. Id. 
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valuation in the Chapter 13 context acts partly to balance the 
inequities between debtors and creditors by relieving the threat 
that repossession poses to debtors. The court also avoided mak-
ing a partisan decision by affirming that circumstances exist that 
warrant using replacement cost to the debtor as the value of a 
secured creditor's claim. 112 
Mitchell successfully avoided the error made by some courts 
which have read 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) in the disjunctive. Instead, 
Mitchell, following Malody, correctly interpreted it as contain-
ing two requirements joined in the conjunCtive.1l3 Completely 
rejected by the Ninth Circuit is an "across-the-board" applica-
tion of the retail price to value security interests in automobiles 
in Chapter 13 proceedings.114 The court held this approach to be 
unsupported by case law, the Bankruptcy Code, and commenta-
tors. IUI Thus Mitchell endorses a balanced approach to estab-
lishing valuation standards under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), an affirma-
tion from a circuit court that had been missing from the 
reported bankruptcy decisions involving family owned vehicles 
prior to Mitchell. 
In fact, the same balanced approach to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) 
that is found in the Mitchell decision appeared under a slightly 
different context in a Fourth Circuit decision, In re Balbus. ll8 
Balbus used both prongs of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and its legislative 
history to decide the value of the collateral. ll7 The Balbus court 
looked first to the purpose of the valuation at issue, and then 
decided on the valuation standard to be applied.118 
In Balbus, the debtor had given an interest in real property 
as security for a debt. The holder of the debt asserted that the 
fair market value of Balbus's real property should not include 
hypothetical costs of sale that the creditor would incur if it re-
112. Id. 
113. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560-51; Malody, 102 B.R. at 748-49; see also In re Balbus, 
933 F.2d 246, 248-51 (4th Cir. 1991); infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text discuss-
ing Balbus. 
114. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 560. 
115. Id. 
116. 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991). 
117. Id. at 249. 
118. Id. at 252. 
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possessed the house.l19 If the creditor succeeded in excluding 
these costs, the debtor would have had to amend his bankruptcy 
petition and shift debt from his secured schedule to the un-
secured debt schedule.120 If this occurred, the Balbus debtor 
would exceed the limit of $100,000.00 of non contingent, liqui-
dated debt imposed on Chapter 13 petitioners by 11 U.S.C. § 
109(e).121 Thus the debtor would have been foreced out of bank-
ruptcy and exposed to his creditor's enforcement and collection 
actions, or forced to convert his Chapter 13 proceeding to one 
under Chapter 7. 122 
The Balbus court'looked first to the purpose of the valua-
tion: to determine if unsecured debts are less than the limit im-
posed by 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). The court reasoned that deducting 
hypothetical sales costs would make this bright line limit less 
useful. 123 Thus the purpose of the valuation is served by cer-
tainty, not hypothesis, so the exclusion of these costs is not per-
mitted under this prong of the 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) valuation 
procedure. 124 
The Balbus court then looked to the proposed disposition or 
use of the collateral. Although this sentence is phrased in the 
permissive disjunctive form, Balbus blurred the line between 
disposition and use by speaking of the debtor's possession and 
119. Id. at 247-48. Cases prior to Balbus considering the issue of whether hyptheti-
cal costs of sale should be deducted from a the fair market value of a debtor's property 
divided their opinions along the debtor-creditor dichotomy. Supra note 37. Those cases 
which held that hypothetical costs of sale should be deducted from a debtor's fair market 
value when the debtor proposes to retain the collateral emphasized the first sentence of 
11 U.S.C. § 506(a). See In re Smith, 92 B.R. 287, 290 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ("Because 
it is the creditor's interest in the estate's interest in property which must be valued, it is 
appropriate to deduct costs of sale regardless of whether a debtor intends to retain and 
use the property."); In re Boring, 91 B.R. 791, 794 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) ("Most 
courts recognize that the debtor's proposed retention and use of collateral does not 
emasculate the fact that it is in the first instance the creditor's interest in the collateral 
that must be valued."). 
On the other hand, some courts prior to Balbus emphasized only the second sen-
tence of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and held that hypothetical sale costs should not be deducted. 
See In re 222 Liberty Assocs., 105 B.R. 798, 803 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); In re Courtright, 
57 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986); see also In re Usry, 106 B.R. 759, 761 (Bankr. 
M.D. Ga. 1989). 
120. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 247-48. 
121. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988). 
122. Balbus, 933 F.2d at 248. 
123. Id. at 251. 
124. Id. at 251-52. 
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use of the house put up as collateral as identical concepts. How-
ever, the court did focus on disposition by noting that the debtor 
had no intention of selling the house. By implication, because 
there is no sale, no sale price is needed, and because no sale 
price is needed, no costs· of sale need be figured or deducted 
from the fair market value for the purpose of this valuation.l~1I 
The debtor's scheduling of his debts in his bankruptcy peti-
tion remained as scheduled by Balbus, no amendment was re-
quired, and his case proceeded under Chapter 13.126 
The strength of the Mitchell, Malady, and Balbus decisions 
lies in their reliance on careful statutory interpretation. Such re-
liance gave a high degree of certainty to their holdings. The 
same degree of certainty is missing from the Mitchell majority's 
analysis of a vehicle's role in. a going concern. As a result, the 
Ninth Circuit created a vague exception to a bright line general 
rule. 
The Ninth Circuit gave slight indication of the extent to 
which a vehi<::le must be linked to the production of income in 
order to be a part of a going concern. The court noted that even 
though Mr. Mitchell drove to his customers' businesses in the 
Cadillac in order to conduct his commercial glass contracting 
business, such use did not produce income.127 Instead, according 
to the Ninth Circuit, the car's use was incidental to his ability to 
conduct his business.l2S However, the precise reason why Mitch-
ell's use of this particular vehicle did not constitute a going con-
cern is not articulated clearly in Mitchell. 129 
On the other hand, Judge Noonan's dissent implies that be-
cause the Mitchells used their Cadillac for more than just pleas-
ure or commuting to and from work, the car produced income.lso 
However, Judge Noonan also downplayed the use of the vehicle 
in the Mitchell's business and instead argued that valuation is 
only to be based on the "key fact" that the debtors proposed to 
125. [d. 
126. [d. at 248, 252. 
127. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 559. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. at 560. 
130. [d. at 561. 
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retain the car.13l Thus the weakness in the approach to valua-
tion in the Mitchell dissent is that it de-emphasizes the purpose 
of the valuation by stressing the proposed use or disposition of 
the collateral. 132 
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Mitchell conducted 
a complete analysis of the extent ,that the Mitchells used their 
vehicle to create income through their business venture. While 
the need to examine this situation raises one more issue to be 
litigated in the course of a bankrupcty proceeding, just such an 
examination appears to be required under the legislative history 
of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).133 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Mitchell decision supports a view expressed by many 
bankruptcy courts. The Ninth Circuit's decision promotes the 
philosophy underlying bankruptcy law that debtors are to re-
ceive a fresh start and creditors are to receive an equitable dis-
tribution of the debtor's assets. The court achieved this goal by 
basing its decision on the construction of the statutory language 
of the Bankruptcy Code and obeying the order of Congress to 
decide valuation issues case-by-case. It therefore ruled that most 
vehicles in Chapter 13 cases where the debtor proposes to retain 
the vehicle are to be valued at their wholesale price, and at 
higher standards where a vehicle is used as part of a going 
concern. 
The Mitchell decision served the lower courts' need for 
clear direction on the issue of valuation and and gave other cir-
cuit courts a clear analytical approach upon which to base their 
decisions. However, the rule announced in Mitchell is limited to 
a specific situation: valuation of vehicles for purposes of confir-
mation of a Chapter 13 plan of reorganization. Left unaddressed 
are valuation standards where other types of collateral are in-
volved and how Bankruptcy Code sections other than 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325 are to be analyzed in conjunction with 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). 
131. [d. 
132. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a); Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 561. 
133 .. Supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text. 
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Mitchell may be extended to control any Chapter 13 case 
where a debtor proposes to retain property used as collateral for 
a loan. The bankruptcy tradition of analogizing between chap-
. ters would support extending Mitchell's holding to such cases, 
absent a specific statutory prohibition. 
In Mitchell, the Ninth Circuit successfully settled an issue 
that had yet to reach the circuit court level, stayed faithful to 
the philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code, and reached a correct 
result for the right reasons. . 
Edwin S. Clark* 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993 
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